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SPOUSAL LABOR SUPPLY AS
INSURANCE: DOES UNEMPLOYMENT
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WORKER EFFECT?
ABSTRACT
We consider the role of spousal labor supply as insurance against spells of unemployment,
Standard theory suggests that women should work more when their husbands are out of work (the
“Added Worker Effect” or AWE), but there has been little empirical support for this contention.
We too find little evidence of an AWE over the 1984-1993 period. We suggest that one reason
for the absence of the AWE may be that unemployment insurance (UI) is providing a state-
contingent income stream that counteracts the negative income shock from the husband’s
unemployment. We in fact find that increases in the generosity of UI lower labor supply among
wives of unemployed husbands. Our results suggest that UI is crowding out a sizeable fraction
of offsetting spousal earnings in response to unemployment spells, although even in the absence
of a UI system the spousal response would only make up a small share of the associated
reduction in family income. We also find evidence that families are making labor supply
decisions in a life cycle context, since there are effects of UI on the labor supply of wives of
employed husbands who face high unemployment risk. Yet, couples do not appear able to
smooth the labor supply response to UI income flows equally over periods of employment and
unemployment, suggesting the presence of liquidity constraints. Finally, wives in families with
small children are more responsive to UI benefits in their labor supply decisions,
consistent with the notion that they have a higher opportunity cost of market work.
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and NBERGovernment intervention in private insurance markets in the U.S. has grown rapidly over the
past 30 years. This rapid growth, along with increased budgetary pressure at both the state and
federal level, has raised the question of whether such interventions are necessary. Answering this
question requires assessing whether, in the absence of government intervention, private arrangements
would emerge to provide insurance against adverse events. One natural private arrangement is
insurance through the labor supply of family members. In the face of a negative shock to the
earnings of one family member, other family members can increase their labor supply to compensate
for the resulting income loss. 1
There have been a number of studies which have focused specifically on spousal labor supply
as insurance against the unemployment of the household head. These studies test for the “added
worker effect” (AWE), which is the entry of wives into the labor force when their husbands lose
their jobs. Somewhat surprisingly, however, empirical studies of the AWE have generally not found
evidence consistent with this contention,
One potential explanation for these findings is that previous studies have ignored the presence
of public insurance for unemployed workers through the unemployment insurance (UI) program.
UI provides a state contingent income stream which counteracts the income effect from the husband’s
job loss. As such, it may mitigate the wife’s labor supply response, so that these estimates
lThere area number of other private arrangements that maybe crowded out by public insurance,
but they are not the focus of our study. The source of private insurance that has received the most
attention in previous studies is own savings. Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that
savings is reduced by the generosity of the social insurance system in the U.S., although the extent
of the estimated “crowdout” varies. Hubbard et al. (1995) use a stochastic life-cycle model to
demonstrate that government social insurance programs substantially reduce personal savings. For
empirical evidence that social insurance programs crowd out personal savings, see Feldstein (1974)
for the case of Social Security; Fishback and Kantor (1994) for the case of workers’ compensation;
and Engen and Gruber (1995) for the case of unemployment insurance. We return in the conclusion
to consider the interaction of spousal insurance and wealth accumulation.2
understate the potential for wives to insure their family income while their husbands are
unemployed.2 If this is true, it suggests that in the absence of public insurance spouses would insure
to a larger extent the income risk from unemployment facing the family.
The purpose of this paper is to re-assess the insurance role played by spousal labor supply,
focusing particularly on role of unemployment insurance. For the sake of comparability to previous
literature we retain the focus on the response of wives to their husbands’ unemployment. While this
focus is somewhat anachronistic in light of the increased labor force participation of married women,
in 87 percent of married couples the husband earns more, and in 73 percent the husband works more
hours (over a two year period) than the wife.3 Thus, this remains a natural starting point for
examining the response of secondary earners.
We do so using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a large nationally
representative survey which follows families over a period of 2-3 years. The longitudinal aspect of
this data allows us to control for underlying heterogeneity in tastes for work in measuring the AWE,
and to follow wives during their husbands’ unemployment spells. And we can match to the SIPP
information about the UI regime in the state in which a family resides to consider the role that UI
plays in determining the magnitude of the measured AWE.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we briefly revisit the AWE question: do wives
work more when their husbands lose their jobs? We consider a fairly rich empirical model which
addresses a number of problems with previous empirical work, but we are also unable to document
a significant AWE. We tien assess whether there is a crowdout role being played by UI. In fact,
2A similar point is made by Topel (1984), and by Viscusi and Moore (1987) and Fishback and
Kantor (1995), who show that the availability of unemployment insurance/workers’ compensation
lowers the compensating wage differentials provided for unemployment risk/injury risk respectively.
3Figures tabulated from SIPP data for 1983-1993 described below.3
we find that there is quite a large crowdout; our estimates imply that in the absence of UI, wives’
total hours of work wou Id rise by 30% during their husbands’ spells of unemployment. At the same
time, however, we find that this spousal response would make up only a small share (about 14%)
of the associated reduction in family income.
Finally, we note that the exogenous variation in
differences in the UI system provides a window onto
income across couples induced by
a number of additional questions
underlying
about how
spousal labor supply decisions are made. For example, is there a response to the contingent income
stream from UI during periods of employment as well, as the life cycle model of labor supply would
imply? To the extent that there is such a life cycle response to UI, does it indicate that couples are
able to perfectly smooth the wife’s labor supply through time, or do they appear to face liquidity
constraints which induce intertemporal distortions in labor supply allocation? And how does the
responsiveness to UI vary with family structure, and in particular the presence of small children?
The paper is divided into six sections. In Part I, we discuss the theoretical motivation for
the AWE, and previous work on this question. In Part II, we describe our data and empirical
strategy. In Part III, we present our basic AWE estimates. In Part IV, we examine the effect of UI
on spousal labor supply. Part V presents the extensions. Part VI concludes.
Part I: Background
~eoretical Considerations
The theory underlying the notion of spousal labor supply as insurance against unemployment
is developed in Ashenfelter (1980), Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), and Lundberg (1985). In a
simple static model, there is presumed to be an Added Worker Effect because the reduced transitory
income of the family will raise the labor supply of the wife (if her leisure is a normal good). This4
effect may be enhanced if increased non-market time for the husband lowers the opportunity cost of
market work for the wife, through substitution in home production; but the extent of complementarily
or substitutability of spousal labor supply remains an unresolved question.4
As Heckrnan and MaCurdy highlight, however, the AWE should be small in the context of
a life cycle model, so long as the income loss from unemployment is small relative to the husband’s
lifetime earnings. In this case, wives of husbands who face higher unemployment risk should
increase their earnings at all times, and not just while the husband is unemployed. That is, to the
extent that unemployment is a transitory shock, it should not distort the intertemporal allocation of
the wife’s labor; there will be more market labor supplied by wives whose husbands face greater
unemployment risk, and not necessarily wives whose husbands are unemployed at a point in time.
There are at least three reasons, however, why the event of unemployment per se might be
expected to cause wives to work more. First, as noted above, the leisure of wives and husbands may
be substitutable through household production, Second, as noted by Mincer (1962) and Lundberg
(1985), if families are liquidity constrained or face fixed consumption commitments, they may not
have the resources to smooth consumption over the husband’s unemployment spell, so that wives will
have to work more during the spell. Finally, as Dynarski and Shefrin (1987) show in their analysis
of unemployment and consumption, even in a life cycle model with perfect capital markets there will
be a response of consumption to both job loss and reemployment if these events convey information
about lifetime prospects. This same intuition applies to spousal labor supply as well.
Thus, the previous literature suggests that there may be both a life cycle response to
unemployment risk, as well as a differential increase in labor supply during the spell of
4Knieser (1976) suggests that the labor supply of spouses is complementary for older couples,
but there is no more recent evidence of which we are aware.5
unemployment. 5 But none of these studies have considered the role of UI, By providing a state-
contingent income stream, UI mitigates the income loss from unemployment. This will have effects
on both decisions over the 1ife cycle and decisions during the unemployment spell as well. We focus
initially below on the effect of UI during the spell of unemployment; in the extensions, we consider
life cycle effects outside of the spell.
Previous Evidence
Most empirical work on the Added Worker Effect focuses on the implications of this response
for aggregate unemployment dynamics. b A smaller literature has attempted to estimate the specific
labor supply response of wives to their husband’s unemployment.7 This literature has faced two
methodological problems, and has dealt with them with mixed success. The first is that there may
be underlying differences in the taste for work between wives of men who become unemployed and
wives of men who do not. The bias imparted by this heterogeneity is not obvious, but if there is
“assortative mating” in tastes for work, then it will bias against finding an AWE in a cross-section
of data. The second is the “discouraged worker effect” (DWE): if the husband’s unemployment is
50ne interesting question is why wives go to work at all, as opposed to the husband simply
taking a new job immediately. The answer implicit in the previous literature, and in our paper, is
that there is some required period of search by the husband for a new job match, and that there may
be a transitory shortfall in family income during that search process, requiring market work by the
wife. We do not model the husband’s search behavior in this paper; we simply condition on a
separation, and not on the behavior during the resulting spelI of unemployment (ie. duration of the
spell). We do this because search behavior among the unemployed has been shown repeatedly to
be a function of UI generosity (for example, see Meyer, 1990), so that it would be an endogenous
regressor in our models of spousal labor supply.
bSee, for example, Cain (1966), Mincer (1966), and Wachter (1974).
7N0 study of which we are aware considers the response of husbands to wives labor supply,
although a number of papers do model joint family labor supply more generally; see Killingsworth
and Heckman (1986) for a review.due to a general economic




downturn, then thewife’s shadow wage may be falling as well, making
generally been unable to document a significant AWE. Heckman and
a life cycle model of labor supply with couple fixed effects that control
for heterogeneity. They initially find no response of wives to their husbands’ unemployment; this
conclusion is reversed by their 1982 revision, which finds a negative (but insignificant) effect of
income and a significant positive effect of the husband’s hours of unemployment, both of which are
consistent with an AWE. Layard et al. (1980) perform a cross-sectional analysis for the UK, and
find that wives’ labor supply actually falls when the husband becomes unemployed. They conjecture
that this may be due to the means-tested welfare entitlement program in the U.K., which resulted in
a high tax rate on spousal labor supply during spells of unemployment by the husband, Maloney
(1987) pursues a similar cross-sectional approach with U.S. data, and also finds no evidence for an
AWE. Lundberg (1985) uses a quasi-difference framework, modelling the wife’s transition to and
from states of non-participation, employment, and unemployment as a function of the employment
status of their husbands. She does find evidence of a small AWE for whites, but she finds the
opposite effect for blacks. Most recently, Maloney (199 1) uses a selection model to try to capture
heterogeneity in tastes for work, and he concludes that there remains no evidence of an AWE.
The mixed conclusions from these studies may reflect their differential success in dealing with
the problems noted above. Moreover, none of these studies has been carried out on data from more
recently than 1982 (and only one since 1976); the dramatic shift in female labor force participation
‘The aggregate literature on the AWE has generally concluded that the discouraged worker effect
dominates the added worker effect in economic downturns. For an attempt to distinguish between
the added and discouraged worker effects using aggregated micro-data across areas, see Mitchell —
(1979).7
since then may substantially change any earlier conclusion. Finally, as noted, none of this studies
has considered the role of UI. We address these issues in our empirical work.
Part II: Data and Empirical Strategy for Estimating the AWE
Data
We use the 1984-1988 and 1990-1992 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a nationally representative survey which collects information from
a large sample of households every four months (waves) over a period of two to two-and-one-half
years, The interviews that we use therefore span the period from the middle of 1983 to the end of
1993. At each interview, households are asked questions about the entire previous four month period
as well as each, month in that period. Data are collected on the demographic and economic
characteristics of each household member and of the household as a whole.
A concern with our analysis is the potential endogeneity of the husband’s labor supply to
decisions made by the wife, such as through joint retirement behavior. We attempt to mitigate this
problem in three ways. First, we restrict our analysis to couples where both the husband and wife
are between the ages of 25 and 54.9 Second, we also restrict our sample to months after we observe
at least three months of employment by the husband. Husbands in this age range who have worked
for at least three consecutive months are likely to be very strongly attached to the labor force, and
therefore it is unlikely that they are leaving their jobs because of work decisions by their wives. 10
we choose only couples that are married for the duration of the SIPP panel, thereby ignoring
the endogeneity of marital status to either the unemployment of the husband or the generosity of UI.
These are worthy topics for future analysis.
1°This left-censoring restriction only excludes 9% of the observations in this age range. Note
that these excluded months include all months for persons who never work in three consecutive
months, as well as the initial months for persons whose first three months of work come at some8
Furthermore, this information on past earnings histories is necessary to assign potential UI benefits
to the husband. Lastly, we restrict our analysis of unemployment to spells where the husband is
looking for work in at least some months, so that we are not capturing early retirement or other
endogenous labor force leaving.
We also exclude couples where the husband is always self-employed, since he cannot avail
himself of the UI system. And we exclude outlying observations with hourly wages below $lAour
and above $100/hour, and monthly hours of more than 400. Finally, we consider couples who are
in the SIPP for at least two years, in order to have sufficient information to identify the fixed effects
models that we estimate, and to consider longer run effects of UI.
Regression Framework
Our basic regression framework for analyzing the AWE is:
(1) LSiL= ~ + ~lXit + @2 UNEMi~ + ~36j + ~47p + tit
Our unit of observation is a spell of employment or unemployment (t) for a person (i). That
is, all consecutive months of employment or unemployment are collapsed into a single observation,
and our dependent variable is average spousal labor supply during the spell; so for each person there
is t observations corresponding to their t spells of employment or unemployment.
This spell-based approach is important for two reasons. First, there is likely to be significant
point during the SIPP panel. We also attempted to deal with endogeneity through an instrumental
variables strategy, using as instruments the unemployment rate for the husband’s occupation and
indust~ in the local area, in a model which controlled for female-specific local labor market
conditions. This approach was not successful, however; it yielded implausibly large negative
coefficients on the husband’s unemployment, indicating that, even conditioning on measures of the
female-specific labor market conditions (as we do below), the labor market conditions facing the
husband are correlated with the wife’s job opportunities.9
correlation in the behavior of couples during a given spell, so that it would be inappropriate to treat
monthly observations on labor supply during that spell as independent. Moreover, for the analysis
of UI, our independent variable of interest,
really only have variation across spells and
UI benefits, is constant throughout the spell, so that we
not within them. Second, by using one observation per
spell, we do not “overweight” long spells in our analysis of UI. There is a large literature which
strongly suggests that the duration of unemployment spells is a function of UI generosity (ie. Meyer,
1990), so that using data on each month of unemployment could lead to selection bias since we
would have more months of observations from cases where UI is disproportionately generous. By
the same logic, we do not want to overweight short spells in our regressions, by having more
observations for individuals who flow in and out of employment; we therefore weight each
observation by the reciprocal of the number of spells for that person, so that each person’s weights
sum to one. 11
We use two measures of the labor supply of wives (LS) from couple i as dependent variables:
employment and the number of hours worked per month. These correspond to the measures of labor
force attachment used in many previous studies of the AWE. Since we are aggregating over spells




variable is a dummy for whether the husband is currently unemployed.
I’This is done within the sample being used. That is, when we use both spells of employment
and unemployment for the AWE analysis, the weight is one over the total number of spells. When
we use only spells of unemployment for the UI analysis, the weight is one over the number of
unemployment spells. An alternative, which deals with the intra-spell correlation but not with the
potential bias from endogenous duration, is to simply pursue the analysis using monthly observations
on labor supply, and to correct the standard errors for the correlation within spells, Doing so yields
results which are similar to those reported below, albeit with somewhat smaller (although stiII
significant) estimated effects of UI.10
We define spells of unemployment as beginning with the first full month that a husband is without
a job, and ending with the first full month that the husband is working and with a job, and as
containing at least one month where the husband is looking for work. 12 In doing so, we deviate
from the usual definition of unemployment by excluding any spells which include months where the
husband is with a job but is on layoff (temporary layoffs). We do so both because wives may
respond differently to temporary and permanent layoffs, and because this type of unemplo yment has
been shown to be particularly responsive to UI generosity (Feldstein, 1978; Topel, 1983), so that
including temporary layoffs might make the interpretation of our UI results more problematic. Our
basic results are similar when we include those spells that are temporary layoffs.
We also focus on all job leavers, and not just job losers. This is because there is no reliable
measure of reason for separation in the SIPP. This is unfortunate, because the AWE discussion
refers to job loss, not quits. This issue is addressed to some extent by our exclusion of spells that
do not result in job search. It is also addressed in our UI analysis by our use of actual UI benefits
received in some models, since only job losers can receive UI; thus, in these models, we identify
the impact on the population of interest, job losers.
X is a set of demographic covariates: the age and education of the husband and the wife; the
race of the wife; and the number of children of ages O-1, 2-5, and 6-18. We also control for a
number of (lagged) characteristics of the husband’s job: a 14 piece spline in his quarterly earnings,
12Weexclude months where the husband is unemployed for part of the month from the analysis,
since it would be difficult to appropriately scale the spousal labor supply response for the share of
the month unemployed, and since many of the spells lasting less than one month may be false
transitions in the SIPP data.11
industry, and occupation. 13 The lagged wage will be an important control for the determinants of
UI benefits, and all three factors help to control for heterogeneity across husbands who do and do
not leave their jobs. The control variables take on their lagged value from the three months before
a given (employment or unemployment) spell begins, and are held constant for the duration of the
spell. 14 Finally, we include a full set of controls for state of residence (bj) and calendar time (we
have dummies for each year period, denoted by 7P).
Our hours of work models include both zero and positive hours, since our goal is to measure
the total hours response. We therefore estimate the models as Tobits, to account for the bunching
of observations at zero. For measuring the spousal response, however, we are only concerned with
the response of observed hours, and not the “latent” hours decision that is modelled by the Tobit;
we therefore report both Tobit coefficients, and the implied effect on observed hours of work. 15
It is also of interest to separate the effect of unemployment on the wife’s decision to work and the
13 The spline points are at the lst, 5th, 10th, 20th, .... 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles of the
earnings distribution for the relevant sample under analysis. We deviate somewhat from previous
labor literature by not including a predicted wage for the wife. We do so because we include in our
reduced form equation all of the variables that we would use to form such a prediction, so that the
predicted wage itself would be identified solely from functional form assumptions on the prediction
equation. When we include a predicted wage as well, there is no effect on our basic results.
14Theone exception to this approach is the wage over spells of employment. In some models,
we will regress the wife’s average work effort during spells of employment on average UI benefits
avaiIable during spells of employment. As such, it is important to control for average wages during
these spells, since (as we discuss in more detail below) wages are an important determinant of both
UI benefits and spousal labor supply. Thus, in these cases, we control for a spline in average lagged
wage during the spell, as opposed to lagged wage at the start of the spell.
IsThe Tobit coefficient corresponds to the latent index model, and therefore measures the
marginal impact on desired hours. The implied effect on observed hours involves a transformation
of this coefficient, as described by McDonald and Moffitt (1980). The implied effect is the sum of
the effect on the participation and hours of work decisions: the change in the likelihood of working
positive hours, times average hours among those who work; and the change in hours among those
working, times the likelihood of working.amount of hours conditional on work.
O~,]b and of conditional hours of work,
12
We therefore estimate both models of employment, by
using a “Heckit” -type sample selection model (Heckman,
1979) to account for selection into positive hours. We have no excluded instruments that separately
identi& selection, however, so that this model is identified solely from functiona[ form assumptions.
In Part I, we noted two problems with inferring the added worker effect from equations such
as (l). The first is differential tastes for work among the wives whose husbands become
unemployed, relative to those wives whose husbands stay employed. We have tried to correct for
observable heterogeneity by including a number of characteristics of the couple, and of the husband’s
job. An alternative, which deals with heterogeneity in tastes that is fixed over the length of the SIPP
panel, is to include couple-specific fixed effects in our models. This fixed effects model can be
readily estimated using the Iongitud inal data available in the SIPP.
The second is the discouraged worker effect. Previous attempts to control for the DWE have
generally relied on average area-specific unemployment rates. These types of controls may be
particularly problematic if women face different job opportunities than men, since variations in the
overall unemployment rate will be dominated by changes in male job opportunities. 17 We therefore




wage of women with the wife’s education level in that state at that point in time.
are computed from the Current Population Survey’s Merged Outgoing Rotation
largest monthly employment micro-data set available, which allows us to precisely
lbWe have also repeated the employment analysis using a dummy for any work during the spell,
and estimating a probit model; the AWE results are very similar and the UI effects are identical.
17Thisis not a problem with the studies of Layard et al. (1980) and Lundberg (1985), who use
area-specific fixed effects. We have estimated models which include SMSA fixed effects, as well
as our state fixed effects, with little effect on the results.13
measure these indicators at a four month frequency,
Part III: AWE Results
Means
The means of our dataset are presented in Table 1. In the first column, we present the means
for all of the spells in our sample. In the second and third we divide these into employment spells
and unemployment spells. Finally, in the fourth and fifth columns we present information from the
first three months of the sample separately for couples where the husband will and will not become
unemployed at some point during the SIPP panel. On average, wives work in 63% of the months
in the SIPP data. Including those who work zero hours, the average wife works slightly under 100
hours per month. Among those that work, the average amount of work per month is 131 hours;
average earnings~our is $7.24. The next two columns offer only mixed support for an AWE.
Wives are actually less likely to work when their husbands are unemployed, but conditional on
working they work more hours; overall, there is only a small change in hours.
However, the remainder of the table also suggests the potential importance of heterogeneity.
Wives of husbands who are unemployed are less educated; husbands who are unemployed also have
much lower earnings prior to becoming unemployed, This is further illustrated in the final hvo
columns of the table. Even in their first three months in the SIPP, when all husbands are employed,
there is a lower likelihood of employment and higher hours conditional on working for wives whose
husbands are going to become unemployed (but are not yet unemployed). Moreover, there is also
a potentially important role for the DWE here as well. The average female wage is lower, and
female unemployment is higher, in the places where wives of unemployed husbands live. This is
true both at the point in time when the husbands are unemployed (comparing columns (2) and (3)),14
and before the unemployment has occurred (comparing columns (4) and (5)).
Regression Estimates
Our results from estimating model (1) are presented in Table 2. In the first three columns,
we do not control for heterogeneity with fixed effects. The first column reports the Tobit coefficient,
with the implied effect on observed hours in square brackets. The estimates are quite similar to what
emerged from the table of means: there is actually a negative effect of unemployment on average
hours of work and on the likelihood of work, but neither estimate is significant. There is a positive
effect on hours of work conditional on working, but the estimated effect is small; the rise of 8.22
hours is only 5.5% of the baseline hours of work among women who are working while their
husbands are unemployed.
The control variables generally have the expected signs. Wives of higher earning husbands
are less likely to work; the implied income effect at the mean husband earnings is -0.14 for the total
hours equation (and -0.11 for the Heckit), which is somewhat larger than the estimates in Mroz
(1987). Labor supply rises with the education of the wife, but is non-linear with respect to the
education of the husband; wives of husbands with low or high education work fewer hours relative
to wives of husbands with average years of schooling. Employment and hours of work also much
lower for those women with children, particularly young children. The controls for average wages
is positive and significant; the unemployment control is negative, but it is only marginally significant
in the employment equation and insignificant elsewhere.
In the next two columns, we move to control for time invariant heterogeneity across couples
in our sample by including fixed effects. In this case, we estimate our total hours equation by ON;
we do not estimate Heckit models here because of the inconsistency of the first step probit with fixed15
effects. 1* The fixed effects have little effect on the estimates, suggesting that our wrong-signed
findings were not due to heterogeneity in tastes for work.
Our results for
literature: there is little
the AWE are therefore in line with the mixed findings of the previous
evidence of a response in wife’s labor supply to the unemployment of the
husband. This may be due to insufficient controls for labor market conditions, small income effects,
or even complementary leisure across spouses. Alternatively, it may be that UI is crowding out a
potential spousal response. We turn next to investigating this hypothesis.
Part IV: The Role of Unemployment Insurance
Empirical Strategy
In order to investigate the crowdout role of UI, we restrict our analysis to spells of
unemployment. We consider separately below the potential effects of UI on spells of
employ ment.19 We run regressions of the form:
(2) Nit = ~ + ~~Xi~+ ~~UIi~+ ~~tj + ~~7p + Ci
where UIil is the amount of unemployment insurance benefits for which the husband of couple i is
eligible during unemployment
expect the coefficient ~2<0.
Our key regressor is
spell t. If UI is crowding out any spousal response, then we would
the unemployment insurance benefits for which the individual is
lBON estimation of the total hours model without fixed effects yielded results very similar to
the effect on observed hours from the tobit.
19Analternative here would be to include both spells of unemployment and employment, as in
(l), and to interact the effect of UI with the unemployment indicator. But this approach would
impose a common set of coefficients on the control variables (including, most importantly, the wage
spline), which may be inappropriate for these quite different samples. Given that we are able to
obtain reasonably precise estimates separately for the unemployed and employed spells, we pursue
the more robust approach of estimating equations for these spells separately.potentially eligible. To create this variable,
state’s UI system for the period 1983-1993.
16
we have built a simulation program which models each
The basis for this program is Employment and Training
Administration (various years), which reports semi-annual information on
addition, it was augmented by information from a number of states and
state benefit schedules; in
from hvine (1990). UI
benefits are calculated as a function of the highest earnings quarter (called the “high quarter wage”,
or HQW) in the “base period” (generally the first four of the five quarters preceding the
unemployment spell), Calculating benefits appropriate] y, therefore, requires at least five quarters
of wage history, which wasn’t available for most of our sample. Since we have at least one quarter
of wage information, we use husband’s earnings in the quarter before his unemployment spell began
as the HQW, and four times that amount as the base period value. For the individuals in our sample
for more than five quarters, for whom we can compute a true high-quarter wage, the correlation
between the UI benefits using the true HQW wage and the UI benefits calculated under our
simplifying assumption is 0.90.20
There are two potential concerns with estimating equations such as (2). First, the UI benefit
for a given individual is a function of characteristics that might otherwise be correlated with the
wife’s labor supply. For example, UI replacement rates fall with the husband’s wage (due to the
progressive nature of state benefit schedules), and the wife’s labor supply may fall as the husband’s
wages rise as well. In order to control for this, we include the aforementioned 14-piece spline in
201naddition, individuals must have some minimum earnings during the base period, and in some
states a certain distribution of earnings (ie. a certain amount earned outside the high quarter), to
qualify for benefits. We apply the state specific rules for minimum earnings amounts to our
estimated base period earnings, but we ignore the distribution rules. This results in 10% of the
sample being coded as ineligible. Once again, for those who are in the survey for more than 5
quarters, we can calculate eligibility exactly; the correlation between the two eligibility measures is
0.88. UI benefits were also tax subsidized before 1987 for low income couples (those with family
income below $18 ,000); we do not model this subsidy since family income is obviously endogenous
to the labor supply decision of the spouse.17
the husband’s quarterly wage to pick up omitted effects of income on spousal labor supply .2]
Second, the unemployment of the husband may not be exogenous to the generosity of the UI
regime in which the family resides, either through job leaving or unemployment duration. Feldstein
(1978) and Topel (1983) find that the probability that an individual is laid off is a function of the
replacement rate, although Anderson and Meyer (1994) find an inconsistent relationship between
layoffs and benefits. This is potentially problematic for our approach, if the wives of the men who
are laid off when replacement rates rise have different tastes for work on the margin. 22 To
minimize this problem, we do not include temporary layoffs in our sample of unemployed, since
these are found to be the type of unemployment that is sensitive to UI benefit levels in the previous
studies. Given our sample restrictions, we do not find a significant correlation between UI benefits
and the likelihood that a husband has a spell of unemployment during the SIPP panel, which rules
out this source of sample selection as an explanation for our findings. 23
Finally, there is an important issue of interpretation of these results. Since our measure of
UI is potential benefits, the estimated parameter 62 measures the effect of making a husband eligible
for one more dollar of UI benefits on the labor supply of his wife. This is not the same as the
husband receiving one more dollar of unemployment insurance. While our sample of husbands are
21 Since we also include dummies for state of residence and calendar year, our model is identified
only from higher order interactions of wage, state, and time, which are presumably legitimately
excluded from the female labor supply equation. We present a specification check which supports
this assumption below.
22Thatis suppose that as UI rises the men who leave their jobs have especially motivated wives.
Then the av~rage labor supply response to the husband’s unemployment will appear to be larger
where UI is more generous, even if there is no legitimate AWE.
23More precisely, we ran a probit regression on all couples where the dependent variable was
a dummy for the husband having a spell of unemployment during the SIPP, and the independent
variables are as in (2). The estimated coefficient on unemployment benefits was wrong-signed
(negative) and insignificant,18
all monetarily eligible for UI (they have sufficiently high past earnings), they may not meet the non-
monetary eligibility requirements (they may have quit their previous jobs). Moreover, even among
the population of men which is eligible for UI, takeup of these benefits is much less than full, as has
been documented by Blank and Card (1991), Anderson and Meyer (1994), McCall (1995), and
others. Estimated takeup rates for UI in the literature vary. For our SIPP sample of (UI eligible)
unemployed husbands, 56% of the spells of unemployment are associated with UI receipt.
On the other hand, this receipt question cannot be answered by a direct regression of spousal
labor supply on UI benefits received. The studies cited above all consistently find that takeup of UI
is endogenous to the level of UI generosity, leading to a potential sample selection bias to the
estimates. Furthermore, there is likely to be considerable measurement error in the SIPP data on
UI benefits received.
There is a natural instrumental variable for benefits received, however: potential benefits.
Potential benefits are clearly correlated with benefits received, and the working hypothesis of this
paper is that potential benefits are uncorrelated with spousal labor supply other than through the
effects of the UI system. In addition, while potential benefits are noisily measured as well, so long
as the measurement error in our imputation is independent of the measurement error in UI benefits
received, instrumenting will correct the measurement error problem.
Thus, we can estimate a system of equations of the form:
(3) BENi = ~ + ~lXi + ~2UIi + ~36j + ~drp + ~i
~i = ~ + ulXi + uzBENi + Uabj+ ~d7p+ ~i
where BEN is the amount of unemployment insurance received by the husband in couple i and the
other variables we defined above. Estimating this system by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) yields
the parameter coefficient of interest, 02, which is the effect of receiving another dollar of UI on19
spousal labor supply.
Both the reduced form parameter from equation (2) (~z) and the 2SLS parameter from
equation (3) (uz) are of interest. The former is most directly policy relevant, as argued by Gruber
(1994). Government policy-makers cannot directly control UI receipt, but they can control the level
of potential benefits. So BZmeasures the relationship of direct policy interest, which is the effect
of raising UI generosity on the spousal labor supply of the potentially eligible population, On the
other hand, U2is a measure of the structural parameter of interest for measuring how spousal labor
supply responds directly to income received. In addition, Uzmeasures the effect on job losers only
(since only they can receive UI), mitigating the problem from having some quitters in our sample.
An important limitation of the 2SLS estimate Uz,however, is that it might overstate the effect
of UI receipt on spousal labor supply. This is because there may be some “option value” of the
program even for those couples where the husband does not take up benefits. Suppose that there is
some fixed cost to taking up UI benefits; an example here would be stigma associated with receipt
(see Moffitt, 1983, for a discussion in the context of cash welfare). This is consistent with there
being less than full takeup among those eligible for the program. Consider now a couple where the
husband is newly unemployed and would prefer not to take up stigmatizing UI, but where there is
uncertainty about the prospects for the husband’s reemployment. This couple may delay takeup until
it appears that the husband will be jobless for a reasonably long period of time. But in the meantime
they will account for the presence of insurance through UI in their choices, including the choice of
labor supply by the wife; that is, the wife will work less initially than she would if this contingent
option were not available, since she knows that the family can avail themselves of UI if necessary.
In this case, al will overstate the effect of UI on those actually taking up benefits, since the
instrument is correlated with the labor supply decisions of those not taking up, and thus negatively20
correlated with the error term in the 2SN equation.x
In theory, this problem could be surmounted with a second instrument which could be used
to model selection into takeup of UI. We were unable to find such an instrument, however. It is
worth noting that this is a general problem with the literature on UI and other social insurance
programs; analysts either estimate the reduced form or 2SN coefficients, but are unable to measure
precisely the option value of these programs on those who do not take them up.
Results
The basic results of our UI reduced form regressions are presented in Table 3. We present
the coefficient of interest from regressions that include all of the covariates shown in Table 2 (and
discussed in the footnote to that table). Our sample consists of one observation for each of the 2560
spells of unemployment for which the husband is eligible for UI. 29% of our sample is repeat
spells; correcting the standard errors for multiple observations on the same individual had little
effect. In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that we are measuring average
hours of work per month, while
the coefficients must be divided
interpretation.
potential (and actual) UI benefits are measured
by 4.3, the average weeks per month in our
As the first panel shows, there is a sizeable and significant negative effect
per week. Thus,
SIPP sample, for
of increases in UI
24More specifically, our goal here is to measure the effect of the treatment (UI) on the treated
(recipients). However, we cannot do so, because there is an effect on the non-treated (potential
recipients who do not take up) as well. Our IV approach is essentially comparing the labor supply
of wives in more and less generous UI systems, relative to the amount of benefits actually received.
Both the true labor supply response to UI receipt and the option value among non-recipients will
cause labor supply to be lower for those groups with higher UI benefits. The IV estimate, however,
attributes the difference between the groups solelv to recei~t, thereby overestimating the direct impact
of receipt.generosity on spousal labor supply.
work 23.7 fewer hours per month
21
For each $100 in benefits per week ($430 per month), wives
(using the implied effect on observed hours from the Tobit
equation). The results also suggest that UI crowds out spousal labor supply both along the
employment and the hours of work margins. The employment coefficient implies that $100 in UI
benefits per week would lower the likelihood that wives work by 12.7%. And the Heckit coefficient
indicates that conditional on work wives work 15 fewer hours per month for each $100 in benefits
per week, although this estimate is not significant.
One means of assessing the total crowdout effect of the UI program is to measure our
predictions for spousal labor supply in the absence of UI. Among the unemployed, the average wife
works 97 hours per month; this figure differs slightly from Table 1 since our sample here excludes
those ineligible for UI. Our Tobit model of total hours of work predicts that in the absence of UI
she would work 127 hours per month. That is, hours of work would be roughly 30% higher during
the husband’s spell of unemployment if there were no UI benefits. Similarly, the
rate of wives with unemployed husbands would drop by almost 45% if UI benefits
Thus, it appears that the presence of UI is a major reason for the lack of an added
that was measured in Part III.
non-employment
were set to zero.
worker response
An alternative means of interpreting this finding is to ask how much of the loss in the
husband’s earnings would be made up by increased spousal labor supply if there were no UI. We
can do so by assuming that wives who go to work or increase their hours earn the average hourly
wage rate for current working wives of unemployed husbands. Under this assumption, our total
hours estimate implies that wives would make up 14% of the husband’s lost earnings. While much
larger than the zero effect that is implied by our AWE regressions, this figure is still relatively small.
That is, while UI is crowding out a substantial AWE, given that UI replaces only a share of the22
workers income and that wives earn much less than their husbands, the associated increase in spousal
labor supply from zeroing out UI benefits only replaces a small part of the lost family income.
As noted above, from a behavioral perspective it is of more interest to examine the response
of wives as a function of the UI benefits received by their husbands. An upper bound on this
response can be estimated by the 2S~ system (3). These results are presented in the next panel of
Table 3. They indicate that for each dollw of UI received per week, wives are work 0.45 fewer
hours per month, and they are 0.24% less likely to work.
A natural means of interpreting these findings is in terms of the direct financial crowdout of
UI. That is, for each dollar received by the family, how much less does the wife earn? Once again
making our average earnings assumption, our total hours estimates show that wives earn 68 cents
less for each dollar of UI received. 25 Recall that this is an upper bound on the extent of crowdout,
due to the option value argument described above; the true amount of crowdout lies between 36 cents
(from our reduced form estimate) and 68 cents. In either case, the results once again suggest a
critical crowd out role for UI.
This estimate also implies quite a large income effect for spouses of unemployed husbands.
We find that for each dollar of income per week provided by the UI system, wives work 0.24 fewer
hours per month; for each dollar of income received, they work 0.45 fewer hours. At the average
non-wife monthly income during unemployment spells ($938.60), the implied income elasticity of
labor supply for wives is between -0.53 (lower bound from reduced form) and -1 (upper bound from
2SM estimate). Both of these estimates are much larger than the income effects estimated in Mroz’s
(1987) careful study of female labor supply, and the income effects implied by the coefficients on
250ne means of assessing the validity of our average earnings assumption is to use earnings per
month in place of hours per month as our dependent variable. Doing so yields a implied crowdout
of 65%, quite close to our implied crowdout using the average earnings assumption.23
husband’s income in our AWE regressions; they are at the upper end of the range of elasticities
surveyed by Killingswofi and Heckman (1986). This may reflect the fact that couples are liquidity
constrained during periods of unemployment, a point to which we return below.
Specl~cation Check: EJects on Wives of Employed Hubands
Our results thus far have assumed that, conditional on our controls and sample selection
criteria, we are measuring a causal effect of UI on spousal labor supply through changes in the
income of the husband. This may not be true for at least two reasons. First, UI benefit differences
may not be exogenous to the labor supply of wives, even after
controls for individual characteristics and labor market conditions.
UI benefits setting responds to changes in the taste for work within
conditioning on our rich set of
For example, it is possible that
states over time in a manner that
is not captured by our control set. Second, own potential UI benefits may have a direct effect on
the labor supply of wives, beyond the indirect effect through their husbands’ benefits. For example,
if own UI generosity increases do induce job separations for wives, then there would be a spurious
(from our perspective) negative correlation between UI benefits and spousal labor supply. An
alternative view, promoted by Mofiensen (1977), is that there is a UI “entitlement” effect, whereby
increases in UI generosity increase the labor supply of workers who want to quali~ for this generous
benefit; this would bias against our findings.zc
Both of these arguments suggest that our estimated effect maybe biased by omitted variables.
But one way to test for their importance is to examine the effect of UI on a control group for whom
these spurious effects will operate, but our true effects will not: wives of employed husbands. Since
*cThisview, of course, presumes that compensating wage differentials do not offset any increases
in potential UI benefits from increased work effort.24
these husbands are not receiving UI, there should be no income effect on their wives.z’ But, if UI
is correlated with spousal labor supply through these other (spurious) channels, then there will be
an important effect on these wives’ work decisions.
Table 4 reestimates our equations for spells of employment of the husband. As in Table 3
(and for Table 5 as well), we only report the coefficients of interest from regressions that include
all of the other regressors in Table 2. The results indicate that there is only a small effect of UI on
the wives of husbands who remain employed: each $100 in UI benefits per week raises hours of
work by 4.6 per month (the implied effect on observed hours from the Tobit estimate, which is in
square brackets). The effect on propensity to work is insignificant. These effects are much smaller
than the comparable effects on the unemployed, implying that our results for the unemployed do not
arise simply through some source of spurious identification.2a
27Except, of course, through life cycle effects of UI outside of the unemployment spell. We
return to this point below.
*gTheestimates for total hours and employment are statistically significantly different across the
employed and unemployed spells samples.25
Part V: Extensions and Implications
The results thus far have demonstrated that UI is crowding out spousal labor supply responses
to the unemployment of their husbands, and that this crowdout is substantial. But the natural
variation in income during unemployment spells that is provided by the UI system offers an
opportunity for learning much more about family labor supply decision-making. In this section, we
explore a number of additional questions about how spousal labor supply decisions are made.
Life Cycle E#ects of UI
Even though the effect of UI on wives of employed husbands is much smaller than the effect
on wives of unemployed husbands, the fact that there is even a small effect may reflect an additional
phenomena: life cycle effects of UI. In a life cycle model, the possibility of receiving UI during
unemployment spells should influence the wife’s labor supply over all periods, not just periods of
unemployment. This is because, as highlighted by the model of Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), UI
is only transitory income, and thereby should not effect the intertemporal allocation of labor supply.
This would suggest a small effect on average during spells of employment, which is exactly what
is found in the first panel of Table 4. But this finding cannot distinguish life cycle effects of UI from
some effect through the alternative (spurious) channels described above.
The presence of a life cycle response to UI can be assessed, however, by using information
on the likelihood that husbands become unemployed. If individuals have a higher likelihood of
collecting UI, then there will be a larger income effect for that couple from increases in UI
generosi~. As such, in a life cycle model, more generous UI will induce less work at all times for
wives of husbands with the greatest risk of unemployment. On the other hand, for couples where
the husband has only a low risk of unemployment, more generous UI will have little effect on theirlife cycle labor supply decisionrnaking.
In the next panel of Table 4, we therefore split the sample of employed months based on the
predicted likelihood that the husband has a spell of unemployment. We first estimate a regression
model of the likelihood that a husband has a spell of unemployment over the duration of the SIPP
29 We then apply these coefficients to our panel as a function of his initial job characteristics.
sample of employed spells to form a predicted risk measure. We then split this employed sample
into those who are above the average predicted risk and below the average predicted risk, and run
separate regressions of the form of equation (2) within each subsample.
The results are reported in the next panel of Table 4. In all three columns, the point
estimates are consistent with there being a life cycle response to UI, The effect of UI on those below
the average predicted risk level is small and insignificant, while the effect on those above this level
is larger; the high risk coefficient is significant for total hours and the hours Heckit, although in no
case is the difference between the high and low risk coefficients significant. Thus, there is evidence
that couples are responding to UI generosity not only during the unemployment of husbands, but
over spells of employment as well.
How Well Do tiuples Smoth Spowal Labor Supply?
The results thus far suggest that there are effects of the UI system both during and outside
of spells of unemployment. But the relative magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that at least some
couples are unable to perfectly smooth spousal labor supply over the life cycle, perhaps due to
liquidity constraints. That is, in a life cycle model with perfect capital markets, there would be an
29The regression model includes the usual set of covariates from our AWE regressions, along
with interactions of our industry and occupation dummies to increase the precision of our prediction.
Our second stage regression then includes these interactions as well.27
equal effect of UI during spells of employment and unemployment. There may still be an AWE due
to substitutability of leisure, but the transitory income provided by UI should have no impact on the
intertemporal allocation of labor supply .30 If families are otherwise unable to smooth consumption,
however, UI benefits will have a differentially large impact during unemployment spells. This is
what we appear to find, comparing the results for unemployed spells (Table 3)
employed spells (Table 4).
A firther prediction of the life cycle model of labor supply with liquidity
to our results for
constraints is that
the differential between the effect of UI during employed and unemployed spells will fall as the
underlying risk of unemployment rises. Consider two couples, one of which (couple A) has a 100%
chance of having an unemployment spell over a two year period,
a 10% chance. Under this scenario, there will be a much larger
and one of which (couple B) has
spousal labor supply response to
UI for couple A than for couple B, since UI increases represent a larger
Moreover, if there are perfect capital markets, then for both couples the
during months of employment and unemployment, since UI is just a source
that there are no intertemporal effects. That is, if couple B should happen
in a low UI regime, they will just borrow to smooth consumption during
having the spouse suddenly work more.
expected income flow.
response will be equal
of transitory income so
to become unemployed
their spell, rather than
Now suppose that there are imperfect capital markets, so that couples cannot borrow during
spells of unemployment. Even in this world, couple A will smooth the impact of UI over the life
cycle through savings, since UI represents a certain income stream. But, for couple B, savings is
an imperfect smoothing device, and if they are unable to borrow or otherwise purchase insurance,
30There could be some small differential effect of UI during unemployment spells, to the extent
that the unemployment spells convey information about future unemployment prospects; but, since
UI is time limited and therefore small relative to lifetime income, this effect should be second order.28
there will be a differential spousal labor supply response to UI during the spell of unemployment
itself. That is, UI will have a larger impact during unemployment spells than during employment
spells for this low risk group. Therefore, there is an additional testable implication of the imperfect
capital markets view: the differential response of spouses to UI during spells of unemployment
should be larger for low risk than for high risk couples.
We test this supposition in the final panel of Table 4, by presenting additional results for our
sample of unemployed spells, split by predicted risk in parallel fashion to the second panel (using
the same cutoffs for high and low risk). Indeed, comparing the coefficients in the second and third
panels of Table 4, for those in the high risk group there is a relatively small additional effect of UI
during unemployment spells: one hundred dollars of UI per week lowers hours per month by 7.3
while the husband is employed, and by 16 while he is unemployed. But for the low risk group, there
is a striking difference between employment and unemployment: each $100 increment to UI results
in only a 0.1 hours/month reduction in work during employment spells, but a 34.2 hours/month
reduction during unemployment spells. Thus, families in this group do not appear to be smoothing
the wife’s labor supply over the life cycle; instead, there is a large differential response to UI
benefits during the unemployment spell itself. This suggests that these families are liquidity
constrained during unemployment spells.
Presence of Young ChiUren
A critical element in labor supply decision-making for couples is family structure. In
particular, the presence of young children may have an important effect on the responses of wives
to the income flows from UI. As discussed in Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), it is likely that
wives will respond more to the state-contingent stream of UI income if there are small children29
present. In the context of a simple static model of the allocation of time, the elastici~ of labor
supply of wives rises with their value in home production and falls with their net wage. 31 So long
as women are in charge of child care, their value in home production will be highest when there are
small children in the household. And the presence of children means that the wife’s work will imply
associated child care costs, lowering her net wage. Thus, a prediction of this model is that the
elasticity of response to income flows during unemployment will be highest when there are small
children present. Moreover, having children in the household may increase the responsiveness of
labor supply to family income because family consumption is less flexible with respect to variations
in income (due to the fixed consumption needs that are tied to children), so that leisure must be more
flexible (Mincer, 1962).
In Table 5, we assess how the effect of UI varies with the presence of children, by freeing
up our UI coefficient by whether there is a child less than 6 in the household. In fact, there is a
much stronger crowdout effect of UI in households with a small child. According to the total hours
equations, households without a child, each $100 in UI income per week results in 18.8 fewer hours
of work per month; but in those with a small child, each $100 of UI per week results in 31.5 fewer
hours, an effect that is over 50% larger. In fact, the main effect of having a young child present is
zero for this sample, in contrast to the large negative effect for the full sample in the AWE
31 Consider a family consisting of two persons, m and f, with utility U = Z, where Z is a
consumption good produced according to the production function Z= L~~bC1-”, Li is the hours of
leisure of family member i, and C is a consumer good. The family maximizes their utility subject
to C = R + w~H~ + wfHf, where R is exogenous income, wi is the net hourly wage for person i,
and Hi = T - Li is hours of work (T is total time available). Differentiating the first order condition
for family member f with respect to non-wage income R, one obtains: 6Lf/6R = a/w~. So the
response of the wife’s leisure (and thus her labor supply) to income changes will rise with a, her
relative value in home production, and fall with w~, her net hourly wage. It is important to
emphasize that the level of labor supply falls with a, which is consistent with the large and significant
negative coefficients on the presence of small children in Table 2. But, conditional on a given level
of labor supply, the elasticity of labor supply rises with a.30
regressions; that is, on average, families with small children where the head is unemployed appear
no longer able to substitute the home production of the wife for lower consumption by the famiIy.
Thus, our findings are consistent with the notion that income variations are a more important
determinant of women’s labor supply when there are small children present.32
Part VI: Conclusions
In the absence of private financial markets for insuring unemployment, a natural presumption
is that other forms of insurance will arise to smooth the family’s consumption over this adverse
shock. One source of such insurance is spousal labor supply. But the strong theoretical
presumptions in favor of an Added Worker Effect have been surprisingly refuted by much of the
previous literature on this topic, as well as by our own estimates using more recent data. In this
paper, we suggest that a major reason for the inability of previous research to measure an AWE has
been the presence of public insurance for unemployment spells through the UI program, We provide
evidence to support this contention; our estimates suggest that UI is significantly crowding out the
labor supply of the wives of unemployed husbands.
While we find a sizeable crowdout, our estimates also suggest that even in the absence of UI
there would still be a large reduction in family income from the unemployment of the husband.
Thus, spousal labor supply only provides at best partial insurance against the income risk from
unemployment. This partial insurance may be due to the other forces counteracting the AWE, such
as the DWE. Alternatively, it may simply reflect the fact that given the relatively low earnings of
32These findings are not simply the result of an omitted interaction with having small children;
when we estimate separate equations for those with and without small children (paral Ieling the second
and third panels of Table 4), the results are somewhat stronger, although the standard errors rise as
well.31
wives compared to their husbands, it is difficult to use this mechanism to substantially replace the
reduction in family income from the husband’s unemployment.
Our estimated response to UI is quite large; the income effects implied by our results are
much larger than those estimated in much of the previous literature on female labor supply. This
large estimated income sensitivity may arise from the fact that households are liquidity constrained
and have fixed consumption needs during unemployment spells. This would be consistent with our
finding that the effect of UI is larger when young children are present. It is also consistent with our
result that families appear unable to smooth the spousal labor supply response to UI over the life
cycle; this is a natural outcome in a model where liquidity constraints prevent couples from
intertemporall y optimizing their labor supply patterns. And it is consistent with the evidence in
Gruber (1994), who finds a significant consumption smoothing effect of UI.33 An interesting
direction in which to extend this research would therefore be to consider the interaction of spousal
labor supply witi indicators of the ability of couples to smooth their consumption, such as
accumulated assets .34
It is also interesting to consider our findings in the context of recent studies of the impact of
female labor supply on income inequality. Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991) and Juhn and Murphy
(1996) find that, despite a secular fall in the employment and earnings of those men at the bottom
of the income distribution since the early 1970s, the labor supply of their wives has increased much
less Wan the labor supply of wives of husbands higher up the income distribution. In this context,
33 The results of that analysis are not inconsistent with the crowdout of spousal labor supply that
we find here, in that the measured effect in Gruber (1994) is relatively small (with each $1 in
increased UI benefits leading approximately to a 27 cent consumption increase).
34This type of analysis will be difficult, of course, since the choice of asset levels and labor
supply should be model led simultaneously.our findings suggest that spousal labor
insurance against unemployment versus
32
supply may be playing quite different roles as short run
long run insurance against changes in permanent earnings
prospects. On the other hand, the findings of these other papers may reflect the fact that the
opportunities for the wives of low skilled men (who are often themselves low skilled) have
deteriorated as well; also, changes in income taxation over this period have given the largest labor
supply incentives to wives of high earners (Eissa, 1995). Considering further the use of spousal
labor supply as insurance against different types of long run and short run income risk is an
important priority for future work on this topic.
Finally, we have not considered the welfare implications of our findings. Our results suggest
that public insurance through UI is substantially crowding out a private insurance mechanism. But
this mechanism is not a costless one. In particular, we have not measured





UI generosi~ is reduced the family is “buying” more insurance by reducing the leisure of the spouse,
and this is not reflected in our estimates. A welfare computation of the effects of UI generosity
changes must account for the family utility reduction from this increase in spousal labor supply.33
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W: Based on authors’ tabulations of SIPP data described in text. Standard deviations in parentheses.37
Table 2: Basic AWE Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)














































































































































































Table 2: Basic AWE Regressions, Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hours Tobit Employed Hours Hours Employed
Heckit OLS
Female Unemp. -32.4 -.176 4.88 -35.4 -.063
(23.5) (.102) (17.3) (21.8) (.128)
Avg. Female 1.20 .003 1.02 1.79 .009
Wage (.51) (.002) (.36) (.70) (.004)
Fixed Effects? No No No Yes Yes
Number of Obs 33169 33169 24197 33169 33169
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions also include spline in husband’s quarterly earnings,
dummies for husband’s industry/occupation, and state and year dummies.39





Potential UI Benefits -0.325 -0.127 -0.149
(0.131) (0.051) (0.095)
Effect on Observed Hours -0.237
Mean 97.3 .618 148.6
Implied Effect at 126.9 .789 168.6
UI=O
2SLS
UI Benefih Received -.623 -0.238 -0.353
(.251) (0.096) (0.225)
Effect on Observed Hours -.454
Number of Obs 2560 2560 1667
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors on employment dummy are
multiplied by 100. Regressions include all of covariates listed in Table 2, as well as spline in husband’s
quarterly earnings, dummies for husband’s industry/occupation, and state and year dummies,40





Potential UI Benefits -0.057 -0.011 -0.046
(0.033) (0.015) (0.024)
[-0.046]
Number of Obs 30056 30056 22153
Employed Sample - Cut by Predicted Risk
Potential UI Benefits- -.002 .009 -.009
Low Risk (.057) (.021) (.034)
[-.001]
Potential Benefits- -.091 -.037 -.093
High Risk (.045) (.023) (.039)
[-.073]
Number of Obs 17633, 17633, 13729,
cow Risk, High Risk) 12423 12423 8846
Unemployed Sample- Cut by Predicted Risk
Potential UI Benefits- -,506 -.184 -.065
Low Risk (.223) (.094) (.179)
[-.342]
Potential Benefits- -.221 -.080 -.151
High Risk (.176) (.070) (.115)
[-.160]
Number of Obs 899, 899, 547,
(Low Risk, High Risk) 1661 1661 1036
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors on employment dummy are
multiplied by 100. Regressions include all of covariates listed in Table 2, as well as spline in husband’s
quarterly earnings, dummies for husband’s industry *occupation, and state and year dummies.41




UI Benefits -0.258 -0.105 -0.141
(0.137) (0.053) (0.091)
[-0.188]
Child <2 4.46 4.041 1.68
(14.9) (0.058) (8.72)
[-2.23]
UI Benefits* -0.255 -0.078 -0.129
Child < 2 (0.101) (0.039) (0.077)
[-0.127]
Number of Obs 2560 2560 1667
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors on employment dummy are
multiplied by 100. Regressions include all of covariates listed in Table 2, as well as spline in husband’s
quarterly earnings, dummies for husband’s industry/occupation, and state and year dummies.